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George M. BREIDERT, at Executor, etc., 
et aI., Plaintiffs an'd Appellants, 
Y. ' 
SOUTHERN PACIFI(:COMPANY et 01., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
L. A. 27222. 
Supreme Court ~f ~.lIfornla, 
In Bank. 
Aug. 20,1004. 
Action by property owners and tenants 
oE property for dama'ges ~ascd on inverse 
condemnation. The Superior Court, Los 
Angeles County, Leon T. David, J" enter-
cd judgments of dismissal and the property 
owners and tenants appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Tobriner, J., held that complaint al-
leging that toss of use of hext intersecting 
street as result of closing of grade cross-
ing substantiaJly impaired right' of access 
and seriously impaired free and full use of 
,property pleaded a loss which was sufficient 
to withstand general demurrers. 
Reversed with instructions. 
Opinion, 34 Cal.Rptr. 237, vacated. 
I. Evidence ¢=48 
Court would take judicial notice in 
inverse condemnation action of facts set 
forth in public utilities commission decision 
respecting construction of railroad grade 
crossing. 
2. Eminent Domain ... 172 
Power to determine whether owners 
and tenants of land, demanding damages for 
invasion of property right: because of a 
closing of access to street, had suffered 
compensable invasion of rights resided with 
courts and matter was not within jurisdic-
tion of public utilities commission which had 
ordered the railroad grade crossing closing 
which resulted in denial of access. 
3. Eminent Domain ~289 
Railroad which was an active joint par-
ticipant in closing of grade crossing which 
resulted in denying owners and tenants of 
land access to an intersecting public street 
was proper party to action for damages for 
inverse condemnation. 
4. Eminent Domain ... 266 
"Inverse condemnation" action is an 
eminent domain proceeding issued by prop-
erty owner and principles which affect prop-
erty rights in inverse condemnation suit are 
the same as those in eminent domain ac-
tion. West's Ann.Const. art. 1, § 14. 
See publientlon Words and Phrnscs 
for other judicial constructions nnd 
definitions. 
5. Municipal Corporations ~669 
Urban landowner enjoys property 
rights. in addition to those which he exercis-
es as :l member of public, in street upon 
which his land abuts, and chief among these 
is an casement of access in such _ street. 
West's Ann.Const. art. 1, § 14; West's 
Ann.Streets & High.Code, § 100.3. 
6. Municipal Corporations ~669 
Urban landowner's easement of access 
consists of right to get into strect upon 
which his property abuts and from thcre, 
in a reasonable manner, to the general sys-
tem of public highways. West's Ann.Const. 
art. I, § 14; West's Ann.Streets & High. 
Code, § 100.3. 
7. Eminent Domain ... 106 
Not every interference with property 
owner's access to street upon which his prop-
erty abuts and not every impairment -of 
access, as such, to general system of public 
streets constitutes a taking which entitles 
him to compensation, and right to compen-
sation must rest upon property owner's 
showing of substantial impairment of his 
right of access to g.eneral system of public 
streets. 
8. Eminent Domain "'307(2) 
Determination of wnether property 
owner had suffered such a substantial im-
pairment of his right of access to general 
system of public streets as to entitle him to 
compensation must be reached as a matter 
of law, but extent of such impairment must 
be fixed as a matter of fact. 
9. Eminent Domain e;::,106 
A compensable substantial impairment 
of property owner's right of acCess to gen-
______________________ ... ,... ~, __________________ Od_: __ ~ _____________________________ __ 
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eral system of public streets cannot be 
fixed by abstract definition but must be 
found in each case on basis of factual situa-
tion. 
10. Eminent Domain ~106 
Property owner's allegation of impair-
ed access to next intersecting street in one 
direction will not constitute an unreasonable 
interference with a general fight of access 
to the system of public streets nor a sub-
stantial impairment of that right, but loss 
of access to next intersecting street will be 
a significant factor in finding an impair-
ment of general right and obstruction of 
access to next intersecting street serves as 
one element of such impairment. 
II. Eminent Domain 0$=>293(1) 
Complaint in inverse condemnation ac-
tion alleging that closing of grade crossing 
with resulting loss of use of next intersect-
ing street substantially impaired property 
owner's right of access and had substantially 
lessened and impaired free and full use of 
property pleaded a loss which was sufficient 
to withstand general demurrer. 
12. Eminent Domain ~147 
Claim by property owners and tenants, 
suing for damages based on substantial im-
pairment of right of access to streets by the 
closing of next intersecting street, as to loss 
of good will and inability t~ obtain employ-
ees, in so far as they related to loss of 
business rather than diminution of value of 
property, did not constitute legitimate ele-
ments of damage. 
13. Eminent Domain 0$=>100(6) 
Injury to public by closing of street 
does not establish compensable loss to pd-
va~ landowner unless he is thereby specially 
injured. 
14. EmInent Domain ~147 
"aaim that loss of access to next inter-
secting street impaired access to property 
by firemen and policemen in event of 
emergency referred to matters too specula-
tive to constitute a compensable loss in in-
verse condemnation action. 
William Katz, Los Angeles, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke 
Jones and Ralph J. Eubank, Asst. City 
Attys., Charles W. Sullivan and Arthur 
Karma, Deputy City Attys., E. D. Yeomans 
and Walt A. Steiger, Los Angeles, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
TOBRINER, Justice. 
In this case of inverse condemnation we 
must decide whether a property owner who 
loses the use of the next intersecting street 
which affords him access to the general 
system of public streets should be com-
pensated. As we point out. although the 
bare allegation of a cul-de-sac does not in 
itself suffice to establish a compensable 
right, a showing of a substantial impairment 
of the property owner's right of access to 
the system of public streets does so. Since 
the complaint in this case alleges such sub-
stantial impairment, it withstands a general 
demurrer. 
PI.aintiffs are, respectively, the owners, 
lessors and lessee of a parcel of improved 
real property located in the City of Los 
Angeles. Fronting on Vaughn Street, which 
runs in an easterly and westerly direction~ 
the property is situated at' the southeast 
corner of Vaughn and the right-of-way of 
the. Southern Pacific Railroad, which runs 
north and south. Immediately to the west 
of the right-of-way and parallel to it, lies 
San Fernando Road. The property has 
been improved by a one-story factory build-
ing used for the manufacture of air-con-
ditioning equipment. 
At the time the plaintiffs acquired the 
property in 1953, and until 1959, Vaughn 
Street crossed the Southern Pacific right-
of-way and intersected San Fernando Road .. 
Plaintiffs and the public used this Vaughn' 
Street crossing as a means of access to and 
from San Fernando Road. In April 1959 
defendants placed barricades across Vaughn 
Street along the easterly and westerly lines-
of the right-of-way and closed the crossing. 
[I] Wc take judicial notice of the fol-
lowing facts, not pleaded in plaintiffs" 
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amended complaint" but set forth in In re 
G. C. Breidert, Decisi9n No_ 61775 (1%1) 
58 Cal.P.U.C. 624 (unreported). By Deci-
sion Number 56398, March 25, 1958, the 
Public Utilities Commission authorized the 
City of "Los Angeles to con'struet -, a grade 
crossing over the Southern Pacific right-of-
way at Paxton Street, 1360 feet south of 
Vaughn Street, and ordered the Vaughn 
Street crossing closed. On November 17, 
1959, the present plaintiffs requested the 
Public Utilities Commission to reopen the 
crossing, alleging that- the closing resulted 
in hardship to the plaintiff company by 
depriving the company and its customers 
of access over the right-of-'way at Vaughn 
Street. 
After a hearing on plaintiffs' application 
the commission found that the Vaughn 
Str~et crossing ranked as 357th most haz ... 
ardous of the approximately 4,500 crossings 
in Southern California. The commission 
concluded that "it is in the public interest, 
considering. both safety· factors. and the 
needs of the [defendants] to have Vaughn 
Street· closed and we !lOW find that there 
is insufficient need for 'a 'crossing at Vaughn 
Stred -to justify "the 'risk involved.": On 
Ailgust 9, 1961,. we denied plaintiffs' peti. 
tion "{or '."ITit of. review of the Public :U:tili·. 
ties Commission order. On March 30, 1962, 
plaintiffs initiated the present action {or 
damages arising out of the closing of ·the 
crossing. Toe trial 'court sustained dc:;fend-
ants' general .demurr~r to plaintiffs' amend-
ed 'complaint and entered judgments of dis-
missal is to both defendants. Plaintiffs ap-
peal these judgments. 
[2] We initially· dispose of two pre-
liminary matters. First, defendants fail to 
sustai~ the ,contention that, since the Public 
UtiUtif!s Commission" exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction to order the closing of railroad 
grade crossings, this court cannot adjudi-
cate th~ preSent action. Plaintiffs do not 
I. An lDverae, condemnation action is an 
eminent domain proceeding initiated by 
the property owner rather than the eon-
demner. Thei principles which affect the 
parties' rights in an in\'crse condemna-
seek ah order to reopen the crossing; rather 
they demand, damages for an invasion _of a 
property right. The power to determine 
whether the plaintiffs have suffered a com .. 
pensable invasion' of their rights resides 
with the courts. (S. H. Chase Lumber Co. 
v. Railroad Com. (1931) 212.Cat 691, 706, 
300 P. 12; Bacich v. Board of- Control 
(1943) 23 Cal2d343, 349, 144 P.2d .818.). 
[3] Second, defendant railroad errone' 
ously urges that it is not a proper party de-
fendant to the present adion. Since defend-
ant railroad was an active joint· particip~nt 
in closing the crossing, it is a proper,party 
to the presertt litigation. (See Talbott v. 
Turlock Irr. Dist.' (1933) 217 Cal. 504, 506, 
19 P,2d 980; Eachus v. Los Angeles etc, Ry. 
Co. (1894) 103 Cal. 614, 621, 37 P. 750-) 
[4] The principal issue of the case re-
solves into whether _ the closing of the: 
Vaughn Street crossing so impaired 'plain~ 
tiffs' right of access in that street as to con-
stitute a taking or damaging of ,property 
en~i~.lirig them to compensation. P'laintiffs~ 
claim rests upon' the provision of the' Cali-
fornia 'Constitution that private property 
may not be taken or damaged for pub-lic' 'tiS~ 
without just compensation (Ca1.~o~st.. art.-
I, § 14). Plaintiffs thus purport to state a 
tau'se of . action in inverse condemnation. l 
[S,6J We have long recognized that·'the 
urban· landowner enjoys property rights, 
additional to those which he exercises as a 
me,mber of the public, in the street upon 
which his land abuts. Chief among· thes\! 
is an easement of access in such street. 
(People ex rei. Department of Public Works 
v. Symons (1960) 54 CaI.2d 855, 866, 9 
Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451; People ex ret. 
Department of Public Works v. Rus:selt 
(1957) 48 Ca!.2d 189, 195, 309 P.2dIO; 
Badch v. Board pf Contr~l. supra,23 Cat. 
2d 343, 349-350, 144 P.2d 818; People v. 
Ricciardi (1943) 23 CaL2d 390, 397, 144 
P.2d 799; Rose v. State of California (1942) 
tion -suit are the lame as those iq QD cmi~ 
nent domain action. (See &118 Y. State 
of California, Rpm, 19' Cal.1d 113. 128 
P.2d 505; Bncich Y. Bonrd of Cont_rol, 
BUDra. 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818.) 
. 
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19 Cal.2d 713, 727-728, 123 P 2d 505; 
Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., supra, 
103 Cal. 614, 617-618, 37 p, 750.)' This 
easement consists of the right to get into 
the street upon which the landowner's prop-
erty abuts and from there, in a reasonable 
manner, to the general system of public 
streets. (See Bacich v. Board of Control, 
supra,23 Cal.2d 343, 351, 355, 144 P.2d 818; 
People ex reI. Department of Public Works 
v. Ayon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 217, 223, 5 Cal. 
Rptr. 151, 352 P.2d 519; Wolff v. City of 
Los Angeles (1920) 49 Cal.App. 400, 405, 
193 P. 862; Warren v. Iowa State Highway 
Commission (1958) 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W. 
2d 60, 67; Wilson v. Kansas City (Mo. 
1942) 162 S. W.2d 802, 804; State ex rei. 
State Highway Commission v. Silva (1963) 
71 N.M. 350, 378 P.2d 595, 599; see gener-
ally Freeways and the Rights of Abutting 
Owners (1951) 3 Stan.LRev. 298, 302.) 
[7] To designate the right, however, is 
not to deHneate its precise scope. Not 
every interference with the property owner's 
access to the street upon which his property 
abuts and not every impairmant of access, 
as such} to the general system of public 
streets constitutes a taking which entitles 
him to compensation. Such compensation 
2. See also StreebJ and Highways Code, 
.ection 100.3 which provides that the 
construction of freewQ1s "shan not affect 
private property rights of access, and 
any such rights taken or damaged with-
in the meaning of Article I. Section 14, 
of the State Constitution for such free_ 
way shall be acquired in a manner pro-
vided by law." 
3. "Wnether a substantial impairment of a 
property right exists is a question for 
the court to determine under all the 
fncts of tbe case. Once thia determina-
tion haa been made. ita extent is then 
determined by the jury." (Del Guercio. 
Severance Damages and Valuation of 
F.o.scments, Cont. Ed. Bar, Condemnation 
Practice, ch. 4, p. 73.) 
4. A similar analysis occurs in other lead-
ing right of access cases. In Rose v. 
Sin,,, Bupra, 19 C.I.2d 713, 729, 123 
P .2.1 ri05, G15. in finding that substantial 
impairment of access in the narrowing 
must rest upon the property owner's 'show .. 
ing of a substantial impairment of his right 
of access to the general system of public 
streets. 
[8] The determination of whether such 
substantial impairment has been established 
must be reached as a matter of law. The 
extent of such impairment must be fixed 
as-a matter of fact. The cases have con-
sistently held that the trial court must rule, 
as a matter of law, whether the interfer-
ence with access constitutes a substantial or 
unreasonable impairment.3 Thus in People 
v. Ricciardi, supra, Z3 Cal2d 390, 402-403, 
144 P.2d 799, 80.5-$6, we said: "It was 
• • • within the province of the trial 
court and not the jury to pass upon the ques-
tion whether under the facts presented, the 
defendants' right of access will be substan-
tially impaired. If it will be so impaired the 
extent of the impairment is for the jury 
to determine. This is but another way of 
saying that the trial court and not the jury 
must decide whether in the particular case 
there will be an actionable interference 
with the defendants' right of access." 4. 
[9] Substantial impairment cannot be 
fixed by abstract definition; it must be 
found in each case upon the basis of the 
of an abutting street resulted from con-
struction of 11 subway, we Rid: "The w-
aues before the trial court in the Cilse at 
bar were, whether plaintiffs' right of ac-
ccss - - - was 8Ublltontiallll and 
unrea80nabzV impaired - - • and, 
if so, the amount of damage suffered as 
the result of such interference. - • ." 
(Italics added.) More recently, in People 
v. Russell, supra, 48 Cal.2d 189, 309 P. 
2d 10. which alao involved the narrowing 
of an abutting road, we noted that the 
duty rests with the trial court to deter-
mine as a question of law. whether the 
property owner had suffered substantial 
impairment of access. Only if - it so 
:finds may it submit the question of dam· 
ages to the jury. (See also Eachus v. 
Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., supra. 103 Cal. 
614, 37 P. 750; McCandless v. City of 
Lo. Angele. (1931) 214 C.t 61, 4 P.2d 
139; Lane :v. Son Diego Elec. Ry. Co. 
(1929) 208 Cal. 29, 280 P. 109.) 
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factual situation,' ~While certain general 
rules have been set forth in the various de-
cisions which have considered the nature 
and scope of this right, each case must be 
considered upon its own fact.... .(People v. 
Russell, supra, 48 Ca1.2d at p. 195, 309 P 2d 
at p. 14). 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that Baeich v. 
Board of Control, supra, 23 Cal2d 343, 144 
P.2d 818, compels a holding that owners, 
such' as plaintiffs in the instant case, whose 
access to the next intersecting street in one 
direction is severed, suffer substantial im-
pairment as a matter of law. The holding 
in Baeich is not so broad. Baeich arose up-
on a demurrer to the plaintiff's ,complaint al-
leging that plaintiff should recover dam-
ages because a street improvement deprived 
him of access to the next intersecting street 
in one direction. The court decided only 
that a complaint which aUeges' impairment 
of access to the next intersecting street in 
one direction does not succumb to a demur· 
rer by reason of that allegation. The court 
recognized that although the right of access 
consists essentially of a right to get into the 
street upon which one's property abuts, and 
to travel in a reasonable manner from there 
to the general system of public streets (23 
Ca1.2d at pp. 351, 355, 144 P2d 818), it also 
includes a "right to pass to the next inter-
secting streets." (Id. 23 Cal2d at p. 352, 
144 P 2d at p. 824.) The court declared, "It 
would seem clear that the reasonable. modes 
of egress and ingress embrace access to .the. 
next intersecting street in both directions." 
(Id. 23 Cal2d at p. 352, 144 P.2d at p. 832.) 
[10] The recognition that the easement 
of access includes a right not only to reach 
the general system of public streets,' but to 
do so over either of _ the next intersecting 
streets in two directions, does not mean that 
in every case an allegation of impaired ae· 
cess to the next intersecting $treet in one 
direction will establiSh a compensable right. 
It will not constitute an "unreasonable 
interference" in the words of Rose v. State, 
5. All Witkin, Summary of Calif Law. p. 
2051, states, It. • • it if easier to 
supra, 19 Cal2d at page m, 123 P 2d 50S, 
with the general right of access to the 
system of public streets. Nor as to such ac· 
cess does it effect, as described in People v. 
Ricciardi, supra,· 23 Cal2d at page 398, 
144 P.2d 799, a "substantial impairment" of 
that right. Loss of access to the next in· 
tersecting street will be a significant factor 
in finding an impairment of the general 
right; and, as Baeich held, obstruction of 
access to the next intersecting street serves 
as one element of such impairment. 
The court's statement in Bacich that not 
every cul-de-sac case is compensable sup-
ports this analysis. Thus at page 355 of 23 
Ca12d, at page 826 of 144 P.2d,we acknowl-
edged that, "[o]ne might imagine many 
circumstances * • • in which- recovery 
should not be permitted or where the rea· 
sons for recovery in the cul·de-sac cases 
might not be logically applied, but we are 
here concerned 'with the particular facts of 
this case and do not purport to declare the 
law for all cases under all circumstances." 
Moreover, the court's reliance in Bacicb 
upon such cases as Rose v.' State of Cali· 
fomia, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505; 
Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry. Co., supra, 
103 Cal. 614, 37 P. 750; McCandless v. City 
of Los Angeles, supra, 214 Cal. 67, 4 P.2d 
139, and Lane v. San Diego Elec. Ry. Co., 
supra, 208 Cal. 29, 280 P. 109, all of which 
affirm the proposition that recovery depends 
upon a showing of substantial impairment 
of the general right of access, supports this 
reading of Bacich. 
That loss of access to the next inter-
secting street does not necessarily create a 
cause of action for impairment of the gen· 
eral right of access is further recognized by 
our recent holding in People ex reI. De-
partment of Public Works v. Symons, supra, 
54 Cal.2d 855, 9 Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451. 
In Symons defendant landowners appealed 
from a judgment limiting severance dam· 
ages in an eminent domain proceeding in· 
"oIving the acquisition of a portion of de-
state these propositioDs thaD to apply' 
them." 
----------------------.-----------------------------
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fendants' residential property to convert 
the tenninus of the street upon which it 
abutted into a cul-de-sac and thus provide 
a turn-around area. Creation of the cul-de-
sac severed defendants' access to the next 
intersecting street in one direction. We 
affirmed the trial court's denial of damages 
for injury to defendants' remaining land on 
the ground that the improvement which 
caused the loss, that is the fr.eeway itself, 
did not lie upon the property taken from 
plaintiff. (People ex reI. Department of 
Public Works v. Symons, supra, 54 Ca1.2d 
at p. 861, 9 Cal.Rptr. 363, 357 P.2d 451.) 
We affirmed the exclusion of expert tes-
timony regarding the decrease in value of 
defendants' property caused by "such facts, 
among others, as the change from a quiet 
residential area, loss of privacy, loss of view 
* * • noise, fumes and dust from the 
freeway, loss of access over the area now 
occupied by the freeway} and misorientation 
of the house on its lot after the freeway 
construction." (Id. 54 Cal.2d at p. 858, 9 
Ca1.Rptr. at p. 365, 357 P.2d at p. 453; italics 
added.) We .concluded that in the absence 
of a right to severance damages this testi~ 
many related to noncompensable items of 
damage. Thus we denied recovery because 
defendants' bare showing that their property 
was placed in a cul-de-sac did not of itself 
satisfy' the requirement of substantial im~ 
pairment of access.6 
In summary, the rule which emerges con-
stitutes one of substantial impairment of 
6. The implications of Symons have not 
gone unnoticed. In Rosenthal v. City 
of Lo" Angeles (1001) 103 Cnl.App.2d 
20. 13 CnI.Rptr. 824. the city rerouted 
Hoscoc Boulevard, the street upon which 
plaintiff's property abutted. causing it to 
bypass plaintiff's premises, and leave 
them on a short street closed at both 
ends. Formerly plaintiff had aC<'ess to 
his property over Roscoe Boulevard from 
the east nod over two streets inter-
secting Roscoe from the north; nfter 
the improvements acc('~s was limited to 
tlle two intersecting streets. In deny-
ing plaintiff recovery for impairment of 
his right of nccess the court stated; 
"The clear cOlllmand of * ,.. * Sy-
mons * * * is that * • • dimin· 
the right of access. Although destruction 
of access to the next intersecting street in 
one direction constitutes a significant factor 
in determining whether the landowner is 
entitled to recovery, it alone cannot justify 
recovery in the absence of facts which dis· 
close a substantial impairment of access. 
[11] We tum next to the application of 
the test of substantial impairment to the 
facts of the present case. Plaintiffs claim 
that the closing of the Vaughn Street cross~ 
ing substantially impaired their right of 
access. They allege that "Loss of access to 
San Fernando Road from Vaughn Street, 
and from San Fernando Road to Vaughn 
Street, has substantially lessened and seri~ 
ously impaired the free and full use by 
plaintiffs of their property." Their com~ 
plaint alleges the serious impact of this loss 
of access upon the plaintiff's real property. 
Thus the complaint sufficiently pleads a loss 
sufficient to withstand defendants' general 
demurrer. 
[12] We note, however, that certain of 
the complaint's allegations incorporate items 
of possible damage wholly immaterial to a 
cause of action for impairment of the ease~ 
ment of aCcess. Thus plaintiffs' claims of 
lost good will and inability to obtain em· 
ployees, insofar as they relate to loss of 
business rather than diminution of the value 
of plaintiffs' real property, do not constitute 
legitimate elements of damage.' 
ished value attributable to the diminished 
access due to a public improvement on 
neighboring property is not compensa-
ble. It may be noted that in Symons 
there was 6'ven a l088 of acces8 to the 
next intersecting street," (Id. 193 Cal. 
App.2d at p. 33, 13 Ca1.Rptr. at p. 827; 
italics added.) 
7. People v. Ricciardi, supra, 23 Ca1.2d 
300, 396, 144 P.2d 799, 802 states the 
rule as follows: ... * • injury to the 
business of the owner or occupant of 
the property does not form an element of 
the compensating damages to be award-
ed. (Citation,) This is so because it 
is' only the value of, and the damage to 
the property itself, which may be con-
sidered. A particular business might be 
:VALENTA v.OOUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
Cite a8 39i P.24 '125 
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PlaintilIs also complain that lithe closing 
of Vaughn Street requires trucks servicing 
the property of plaintiffs, and other indus-
tdes along Vaughn Street, to use Bradley 
Avenue, to Paxton Street; said Bradley 
Avenue is a narrow, residential street and 
the ·use of the same by heavy trucks is dan~ 
gCTOUS and adverse to the best interests of 
the public using the-' same; if said Vaughn 
Street crossing is permitted to remain ob-
structed and dosed, the 'access to the prop-
erty of said plaintiffs by fire, police and 
other public services, in the event of emerg-
encies, will be greatly' impaired and de-
layed," 
[13,14] The first of these contentions 
relat,es to matters already considered fully 
by the Public _Utilities Commission (In re 
G. C. Breidert, Decision ,No. 61775, supra, 
58 Cal.P.U.C. 624 (unreported)), and in any 
event injury to the public does not establish 
a compensable loss to a private landowner 
unless he is thereby specially injured. (E.g., 
Eachus v. Los Angeles etc. Ry., supra, 103 
Cal. 614, 37 P. 750.) Tho. second contention 
refers to' matters too speculative to produce 
a compensable 10ss.8 (See "Rose v. State of 
California, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 738. 123 P. 
2d 50S.) 
At a time when the tremendous growth of 
population ,of this state compels rerouting 
and rearrangement of streets and highways, 
the claimed damages to property owners 
from loss of access to the next intersecting 
street and to the general system of streets 
must be more than formal. It must be a true 
loss; it must be substantial. -
entirely destroyed and yet n9t diminish 
the actual value of the property for its 
1lighest and best usc." (See HoUowny v. 
Pureell (1950) 3,'l CaI.2d 220. 230. 217 
P.2d 005; People v. Sayig (1951) 101 
Cal.App.2d 890. 226 P.2d 702; City of 
Los Angeles v. Geiger (1949) 94 CaL 
App.2d 180. 191. 210 P.2d 717; Wolff 
v. City of Los Angeles (1920) 49 Cal. 
App. 400. 402. 193 P. 862; Oakland v. 
Pacific Coast Lumber etc. Co. (1915) 
171 Cal. 392, 399, 153 P. 705.) 
The judgments are reversed with instrue-
tions to overrule the general demurrers and 
to permit the parties to proceed in a manner 
consistent with this opinion. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SCHAUER, Mc-
COMB, PETERS and PEEK, JJ., concur. 
TRAYNOR, Justice (concurring). 
Although I adhere to the views set forth 
in my dissenting opinion in Bacich v. Board 
of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 366-380, 144 P.2d 
818, that case is the law of this state until it 
is overruled. I therefore concur in the 
judgment herein under the compulsion of 
the Bacich case. 
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Ronald J. VALENTA.t al., Plalntl1ra 
and Appellants, 
Y. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES .t aI., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
L. A. 27655. 
Supreme Court of California. 
In Bank. 
Aug. 20. 19M. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 18. 1964. 
Action for damage to plaintiffs' prop-
erty resulting from the closing of access to 
a highway. The Superior Court, Los Ange-
les County, Macklin Fleming and Leon T. 
David, JJ., sustained defendants' general 
8. "Plnintiffs also claim damages for the 
taking of an easement over the Vaughn 
Street crossing and _ for maintenance of 
n nuisnnce. PlaintUfs have no property 
right in the public crossings (see City 
of San Mateo v. Railroad Com. (1937) 9 
Ca1.2d 1. 68 P.2d 713) and plaintiJfs 
state no calise of action for mnintennnce 
Q~ a nuisance unless they show that they 
have been specially injured (see Bigley 
v. Nunan (1879) 53 C~"t1. 403). 
